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 
Abstract— According to Veracode, a Gartner-recognised 
leader in application security, 44% of applications contain 
critical vulnerabilities in an open source component [16].  
Most companies do not have a reliable way of being 
notified when zero-day vulnerabilities1 are found, or when 
patches are made available.  This means that attack 
vectors in Open Source Software (OSS) exist longer than 
they should.  This paper discusses the cause of OSS 
vulnerabilities, why they are a major issue, and how they 
may be mitigated.  Conventional methods of detection are 
discussed along with novel approaches and research 
trends.  A new conclusion is made that it may not be 
possible to replace expert human inspection of OSS 
although it can be effectively augmented with techniques 
such as machine learning, IDE plug-ins and repository 
linking to make OSS implementation and review less time 
intensive.  Underpinning any technological advances 
should be better knowledge at the human level – 
development teams need trained, coached and improved so 
they can implement OSS more securely, know what 
vulnerabilities to look for and how to handle them.  It is 
the use of this blended approach to detection which is key.   
 
Index Terms— open source software, cyber security, 
vulnerability detection, static analysis, dynamic analysis, software 
assurance, machine learning. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
pen source software is that which is developed 
collaboratively in the public domain with a licence that 
grants rights to the user base which are usually reserved 
for copyright holders.  A well-known open source licence is 
the GNU General Public Licence that allows free distribution 
under the condition that further developments are also free.  In 
a globally connected software society, a sizeable amount of 
development work is effectively crowdsourced to an 
international community of OSS developers with little 
understanding of the security problems this creates [1].  3rd 
party libraries increase development speed but there is a 
corresponding increase in risk also, with the Heartbleed bug in 
OpenSSL2 being a prime example. 
 
This paper was submitted on 26th March 2017 by Stuart Millar, PhD Cyber 
Security Researcher at the Queen’s University of Belfast.  Email: 
smillar09@qub.ac.uk 
1A zero-day vulnerability is an undisclosed software vulnerability that 
hackers can exploit to adversely affect programs, data, additional computers or 
a network. 
Research into vulnerability detection in OSS is crucial as 
more than half of the Fortune Global 500 companies use 
vulnerable OSS components, with vulnerable libraries also 
being repackaged in software.  This OSS uptake shows no sign 
of reversing or slowing, with a Black Duck Software survey 
[19] indicating that 43% of respondents think OSS is superior 
to its commercial equivalent.  Black Duck Software are a 
global provider of note with regard secure management of 
OSS code.  
Another study carried out in 2012 from Aspect Security (a 
founding member of the Open Web Application Security 
Project, OWASP) and Sonatype found that more than 50% of 
the Fortune Global 500 companies have downloaded 
vulnerable OSS components, security libraries and web 
frameworks [2].  This study analysed 113 million Java 
framework and security library downloads by more than 
60,000 commercial, government and non-profit organisations 
from the Central3 Repository.  The report found the vast 
majority of library flaws remain undiscovered, that the 
presence of a vulnerability (or an absence of one) is not a 
security indicator, and that typical Java applications are likely 
to include at least one vulnerable library. 
Further, the same study shows most organisations do not 
have a strong process in place for ensuring the libraries they 
rely upon are up-to-date and free from vulnerabilities.  The 
study stresses there are no shortcuts and they go as far as 
saying the only useful indicator of library security is a 
thorough review that finds minimal vulnerabilities – in other 
words, software assurance, or the measure of how safe the 
software is to use, needs to be generated internally.  One might 
say this is surprising, as in many other product or service 
industries, this assurance – consider it some kind of warranty 
or seal of approval perhaps – is offered up by the supplier 
without hesitation to help build trust and sell to the customer. 
At the crux of OSS vulnerability is that today’s applications 
commonly use thirty or more libraries which in turn can 
comprise up to 80% of the code in any such application.  
These libraries have the same full privileges of the application 
that use them, letting them access data, write to files or send 
data to the internet.  Anything the application can do, the 
library can do.   
2 Heartbleed results from improper input validation (due to a missing bounds 
check) in the implementation of the TLS heartbeat extension.  The vulnerability 
is classified as a buffer over-read, a situation where more data can be read than 
should be allowed. 
3 Central is the software industries most widely used repository of OSS with 
more than 300,000 libraries.   
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Aspect Security estimate that custom built Java applications 
contain 5-10 vulnerabilities per 10,000 lines of code.  A 
library has on average 10,000 to 200,000 lines of code, 
therefore the chances a library has never had a vulnerability 
are very slim, with it being more likely (if it has been classed 
as ‘safe’) that it has not been examined for vulnerabilities.  
Hence libraries with no vulnerabilities should not 
automatically be considered ‘safe’.  [2] states most 
vulnerabilities are undiscovered which, based on this 
reasoning, seems logical, and recommends that the only way 
to deal with the risk of unknown vulnerabilities is to have 
someone who understands security analyse the source code.  
Tool support provides hints but is not a replacement for 
experts because, as we will see when we study existing 
conventional methods of detection in Section II, the lack of 
context within libraries makes it virtually impossible for tools 
to conclusively identify vulnerabilities. 
Pham et al. [4] take the same position as the 
Aspect/Sonatype study, agreeing that recurring vulnerabilities 
in software are due to reuse.  This reuse includes the same 
code base with an identical or very similar code structure, 
method calls and variables.  Interestingly these attributes form 
the basis of a proposed method of detecting unreported 
vulnerabilities in one system by consulting knowledge of 
reported vulnerabilities in other systems that reuse the same 
code.  This is included as part of the discussion of new 
detection methods in Section III. 
Linus’ Law [8] is often quoted in relation to OSS, which is 
“given enough eyeballs, all bugs are shallow”, meaning with a 
large enough number of developers looking at code, errors can 
be found.  However, this is a questionable claim from a 
scientific viewpoint, and an empirical study of Linus’ Law by 
Meneely and Williams [9] appeared to show more 
collaboration meant more vulnerabilities.  They found that 
files with changes from nine or more developers were sixteen 
times more likely to have a vulnerability than files changed by 
fewer than nine developers.  The inherent collaborative nature 
of OSS unavoidably creates vulnerabilities that require 
addressing. 
A review of existing relevant literature regarding 
conventional and newly researched detection methods was 
carried out [1-7, 9-15].  Section II handles the former, Section 
III the latter and then conclusions are presented with ideas for 
future work. 
II. CONVENTIONAL METHODS OF OSS VULNERABILITY 
DETECTION 
This is a relatively new area of research so there is not an 
abundance of publications on methods of vulnerability 
detection in OSS.  However, those that have been written thus 
far describe three conventional methods – static analysis (a 
black box4 technique), dynamic analysis (a white box5 
technique) and code reviews (again, a white box technique).  
 
 
 
4 Black box testing is a software testing method in which the internal 
structure/ design/ implementation of the item being tested is not known. 
5 White box testing is a method of testing software that tests internal 
structures or workings of an application. 
 
1. Static Analysis 
 
Many static analysis techniques and tools scan source code 
and detect vulnerabilities in software after it has been written, 
which encourages late detection and produces a lot of false 
positives6.  In the literature reviewed for this paper, Sampaio 
& Garcia [6] were the only researchers that explicitly 
referenced the cut and thrust of the software development 
process, saying that external static tools for secure 
programming don’t fit into such a workflow, since they don’t 
work with the IDE and are retrospective.  Zhang et al. [3] 
concur that static analysis produces high levels of false 
positives, as do Grieco et al. [12] and Perl et al. [10].  
Shahmehri et al. [5] point out it is hard to know both which 
vulnerabilities a static analysis tool deals with, and to get 
assurance a tool is up-to-date.   
Goseva-Popstojanova and Pehinschi [7] specifically wrote 
about the capability of static code analysis to detect 
vulnerabilities, concluding that tools are not effective.  They 
tested three widely used commercial tools and found 27% of 
C/C++ vulnerabilities and 11% of Java vulnerabilities in their 
dataset were missed by all three.  In some cases, they were 
comparable to or worse than random guessing.  They too make 
the point about tools being prone to false positives, and this 
consolidates the need to find other methods of detection rather 
than rely solely on static analysis.  That is not to say static 
analysis is of little use, as some compliance regulations 
require inventories of OSS components so that risks can be 
addressed.  Static tools, such as Veracode Software 
Composition Analysis (SCA) [16], can scan open source code 
and create an inventory, so when a new vulnerability is 
disclosed, it is known which applications use the vulnerable 
OSS.  Another example is the OWASP Dependency-Check 
tool [18] that analyses code and creates reports on associated 
CVE entries. 
 
2. Dynamic Analysis 
 
Dynamic analysis can also be called runtime analysis.  
Fuzzing is used here, where inputs are changed using random 
values to detect unwanted behavior [5].  Hafiz and Fang [11] 
researched the nuances of how vulnerabilities were discovered 
by reporters, and how those same reporters shared their 
findings with the OSS community.  They found running a 
fuzzer and debugging was the chosen method for developers 
exploring binary executables to find buffer overflows.  
Vulnerability reporters tend to make their own fuzzing tools, 
seeing it as part of the learning process and preferring this 
approach over more systematic exploration methods. 
[12] notes the usefulness of fuzzing, and that it needs only 
basic knowledge to undertake, however they also say fuzzing 
does not allow the control of program execution, large 
campaigns are needed for results, and it is time consuming.  
[3] contends fuzzing doesn’t scale, if dynamic symbolic 
6 A test result which wrongly indicates that a particular condition or attribute 
is present, i.e. a false alarm 
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execution7 is used, as it explores code paths simultaneously 
which could create large workloads. 
 
3. Code Reviews 
 
These involve manual inspection of the source code.  
Consequently, this method requires a lot of human effort, a 
view shared by Perl et al. [10].  Working on source code 
manually does without question however detect vulnerabilities 
[11], and recall that [2] argued code reviews, conducted by 
someone with appropriate security knowledge, is in fact the 
only way to properly deal with vulnerabilities. 
III. NEW METHODS OF OSS VULNERABILITY DETECTION 
We have established the issues with the conventional 
methods in the main are that static analysis produces too many 
false positives, dynamic analysis doesn’t scale, and code 
reviews are very time consuming.  Research into new methods 
tries to address these problems via some interesting and novel 
approaches.   
 
1. Distributed demand-driven security testing  
 
Proposed by Zhang et al. [3], this involves many clients 
using OSS, and one main testing server.  For this paper, a hub 
and spoke layout has been used for illustration, as per Figure 
1.  When a new path in a program is about to be exercised by 
user input, it is sent to the testing hub for security testing.  
Symbolic execution is applied to the execution trace to check 
potential vulnerabilities on this new path, and if one is 
detected then a signature is generated and updated back to all 
the clients for protection.  If a path exercised by an input will 
trigger any vulnerability that has already been detected, the 
execution is terminated.  This allows testing to focus on paths 
being used and stops attackers exploiting unreported 
vulnerabilities at a client site.   
 
Figure 1 – Hub and spoke layout for distributed demand-
driven security testing 
 
7 Symbolic execution uses symbolic values for variables instead of concrete 
values to execute all paths in a program. 
However, questions remain over how to handle the large 
time and space overheads at the client sites, how sensitive data 
is transmitted and handled, and actual implementation details 
are scarce.  That said, the principle of increasing test coverage 
of important paths as users exercise them is sound, and [3] 
offers a basic conclusion that machine learning can identify 
patterns of bugs at the testing server and use them to predict 
problematic code. 
 
2. Use of Execution Complexity Metrics  
 
Shin et al [13] examined complexity metrics collected 
during code execution, considering them potential indicators 
of vulnerable code locations.  Table 1 describes these metrics.  
They measure the frequency of function calls and duration of 
execution functions.  Firefox and Wireshark were studied 
using Callgrind8 to gather the metrics and the results showed 
these execution complexity metrics may be better indicators of 
vulnerable code than the conventional static complexity 
metric, Lines of Code (LoC).    
 
Name Definition 
NumCalls The number of calls to the functions 
defined in a file. 
InclusiveExeTime Execution time for the set of 
functions, S, defined in a file 
including all the execution time 
spent by the functions called directly 
or indirectly by the functions in S. 
ExclusiveExeTime Execution time for the set of 
functions, S, defined in a file 
excluding the execution time spent 
by the functions called by the 
functions in S. 
 
Table 1 – Execution complexity metrics defined in [13] 
 
The initial results, shown in Table 2, indicate the percentage 
of vulnerable files in execution is higher than the percentage 
of vulnerable files in total, and hence execution complexity 
metrics could be good indicators of vulnerability.  This can 
reduce the code inspection effort as prioritisation can take 
place based on the metrics. 
 
Program % of vulnerable 
files 
% of vulnerable 
files in executed 
files 
Firefox 3.8% 11% 
Wireshark 7.8% 19% 
 
Table 2 – Execution statistics from [13] 
 
 
 
 
8 Callgrind is a Valgrind tool for profiling programs. The collected data 
consists of the number of instructions executed on a run, their relationship to 
source lines, and call relationship among functions together with call counts.  
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4. Integrated Development Environment (IDE) Plugins for 
Early Detection 
 
Sampaio & Garcia [6] attempted to detect vulnerabilities 
earlier in the development process by using an Eclipse Java 
plug-in, arguing developers should be aware of security 
vulnerabilities as they are coding.  To reduce false positives, 
they proposed context-sensitive data flow analysis which uses 
a program’s context of variables and methods when searching 
for vulnerabilities instead of pattern matching, 
Zhu et al. [14] present interactive static analysis, also 
known as IDE static analysis.  They too developed an Eclipse 
Java plug-in for detecting code patterns that gives a two-way 
interaction between the IDE and the developer.  According to 
[14], their tool detected multiple zero day vulnerabilities.   
Figure 2 shows a screenshot of this tool where the 
developer is instructed to annotate access control logic for a 
highlighted sensitive method call. 
 
 
Figure 2 – a screenshot from an IDE static analysis tool 
developed in [14] 
 
5. Machine Learning   
 
Most OSS code is managed using version control systems 
like Git or CVS, with vulnerable code inserted via commits 
from the developer to the main data repository.  But most tools 
can’t run on a small code snippet in an individual commit, and 
checking the whole project is time consuming.  Perl et al. [10] 
implemented a type of machine learning algorithm9 called a 
Support Vector Machine (SVM) that used metadata10 from 
commits made to OSS repositories.   
The SVM used features from the metadata such as the 
number of added, deleted or modified functions and how often 
a contributor had contributed to a given project before.  Their 
results showed that false positives were reduced by over 99% 
compared to those generated by a static analysis tool - to be 
exact, their SVM driven tool generated 36 false positives 
compared to 5460 generated from the static analysis tool.  The 
goal of their work was to reduce the chance of vulnerabilities 
getting from a vulnerable commit into the fully deployed 
software.   
 
9 Machine learning is a type of artificial intelligence where computers use 
algorithms to learn iteratively, teaching themselves to recognise patterns. 
[12] also developed a machine learning tool to predict 
vulnerabilities for large scale software like operating systems.  
They took the popular Debian OS as an example, since it has 
30,000 programs and 80,000 bug reports.  Clearly, code flaws 
can be hard to find manually in a code base of that size, so the 
application of machine learning is of interest.  Their 
classification results were not conclusive but nevertheless, as 
an initial study, they showed promise for large-scale 
vulnerability detection only using binary executables, an 
approach which does not appear to have been attempted 
elsewhere. 
 
6. Further Knowledge Formalisation and Linking Repositories 
 
Algahtani et al. [15] discussed formalising knowledge 
representation to determine transitive dependencies in 
software.  The idea is the various vulnerability repositories 
that exist online like the NIST National Vulnerability 
Database, or the Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) 
database can be linked and simultaneously used to find out if a 
project is indirectly dependent on vulnerable components. 
IV.  CONCLUSIONS & FUTURE WORK 
The global use of OSS presents such a huge number of 
attack vectors that discovering novel techniques of 
vulnerability detection is an essential area of research.  Of the 
new methods mentioned in this paper, it is the opinion of the 
author that machine learning, early detection IDE plug-ins and 
linking repositories show much promise for future work.  
Machine learning lends itself well to feature-rich OSS which 
speeds up classification of vulnerable code and reduces the 
time burden on development teams.  Early detection IDE plug-
ins will help developers implementing OSS to grow and 
consolidate their secure coding knowledge.  Linking 
repositories ensures better value from the separate, 
unconnected datastores of vulnerabilities as they presently 
exist.   
Improvements in OSS vulnerability detection may be 
quicker to realise than one would think – English et al. [17] 
mention Pareto’s law, where 80% of effects can be contributed 
to 20% of causes, and so identifying a small proportion of 
problematic OSS code then focusing testing efforts using a 
selection of detection methods could improve code quality and 
time-to-release, whilst reducing development and maintenance 
costs.  The exact mix of techniques will vary from one OSS 
scenario to another but the conclusion this paper draws is that 
the very existence of a strategy that uses a blend of methods 
that augment each other is likely to be of significantly more 
benefit than using just one approach in isolation. 
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